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 Are United States Consumers
 Tolerant of Genetically
 Modified Foods?
 Matthew Rousu, Wallace E. Huffman,
 Jason F. Shogren, and Abebayehu Tegene
 Controversy surrounds the introduction of genetically modified foods. One key issue re-
 lates to tolerance levels-the impurity rate tolerated before a commodity must be labeled.
 Currently, the United States has not defined a tolerance level for genetically modified
 foods. This paper uses data from experimental auctions to test whether consumers prefer
 foods with 0, 1, or 5% tolerance levels for genetically modified material. We conclude con-
 sumers would pay less for food that tolerates genetically modified material, but find no ev-
 idence that consumers' place different values on foods with 1 and 5% genetically modified
 content.
 The use of biotechnology to create genetically modified products has caused
 many scientists to envision a new Green Revolution. Genetically modified
 organisms (GMOs), however, have attracted strong criticism from a set of antago-
 nists, and some consumers are reluctant to accept new food products they perceive
 as risky, which includes products that involve some form of genetic modification.
 Genetically modified (GM) foods remain controversial. Some groups want GM
 foods banned (e.g., Greenpeace International), while others believe GM foods
 can help feed the world (Council for Biotechnology Education, Gates). Because a
 complete ban on GM foods has thus far been politically infeasible, environmen-
 tal and consumer groups have successfully lobbied for labeling GM foods in the
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 European Union and some other countries, including Australia, Brazil, China,
 Japan, Korea, and New Zealand.
 Tolerance-the acceptable percentage of GM impurity in a product before it
 must be labeled as GM or before it cannot use a non-GM label-is a key issue in
 the labeling debate. Countries have accepted positive tolerance standards because
 a zero tolerance standard is prohibitively costly, and a perfect segregation sys-
 tem can never be guaranteed (Shoemaker et al.; Golan, Krissoff, and Kuchler).1
 The European Union, for instance, revised its mandatory GM-labeling policy in
 January 2000, to contain a positive tolerance level-all foods have to be labeled
 as GM if any ingredient in the product is at least 1% GM (Rousu and Huffman).
 The European Parliament recently voted for a 0.9% threshold, but member coun-
 tries must ratify the new rules before they take effect (CNN.com). Australia also
 has defined a 1% tolerance for GM impurity. Other countries have also defined
 tolerance levels that must be met before GM labeling is required. Japan tolerates
 up to 5% impurity before a GM label is needed. Korea allows 3% tolerance, and
 Brazil allows 4% tolerance. Thailand has different tolerance levels for different
 products-5% for soybeans and 3% for corn (Shipman).
 The United States currently does not require labeling of GM foods and has not
 defined a positive tolerance standard. Legislation to require mandatory labeling
 in the United States was introduced in the 2000 session of Congress in the House
 (H.R. 3377) and Senate (S. 2080). Although neither bill passed, they suggest the
 mix of policy choices being considered by some U.S. legislators. The question we
 address here is how U.S. consumers react to a positive tolerance standard for GM
 ingredients. We designed an experimental auction using three GM products to
 test two hypotheses: (a) mean consumer bids for the GM-free products equal the
 mean bids for the GM-threshold products, set either at 1% or 5% and (b) mean
 bids for the 1% GM product equal the mean bids for the 5% GM product.2
 Given our results, we reject the first hypothesis (a), but not the second one (b).
 Our sample of consumers reduced their valuation of one unit of the commodity
 with GM impurity by an average of about 10% relative to the GM-free baseline,
 irrespective of whether the GM threshold was set at 1 or 5%. This finding points
 to a policy recommendation worthy of future study in nationwide survey or
 experimental auction work-if a tolerance level is to be used in the United States,
 a 5% GM threshold has the potential to be more efficient than a 1% GM threshold
 because the 5% level is less costly to meet and demand reduction is independent
 of the 1 and 5% tolerance levels.
 Experimental Design
 Previous experimental auctions have examined the willingness to pay for GM
 foods. Using potatoes, vegetable oil, and tortilla chips, U.S. consumers from the
 Midwest discounted GM-labeled foods by an average of 14%. The discount could
 be higher (or lower), depending on the information the consumer received (Rousu
 et al., Tegene et al.). Lusk et al., using fifty students from the Midwestern United
 States, found that most subjects in an experiment were not willing to pay to up-
 grade a bag of GM chips to a bag of non-GM chips. Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux
 (2002a) conducted experimental auctions using ninety-seven consumers in France
 and found that consumers valued biscuits with a 1% and a 0.1% tolerance level
This content downloaded from 129.186.1.55 on Fri, 18 Nov 2016 16:56:39 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Are U.S. Consumers Tolerant of Genetically Modified Foods? 21
 differently (they also were bidding on non-GM and GM biscuits-four biscuits
 total). They reported that consumers did not prefer 0.1% GM or 1% GM content
 to a GM-free product. One problem with their experimental design is that they
 were selling consumers four different biscuits that were, in their words, close sub-
 stitutes. Selling four close substitutes leads to demand reduction by consumers
 perceiving the potential of obtaining multiple units, which could cause a con-
 founding problem where one does not know if bid reduction is due to genetic
 modification or demand reduction.
 Our experimental auction markets used a randomized treatment, statistical ex-
 perimental design. Consumers bid on three food products that have different
 tolerance labels. In one trial, all consumers bid on foods with a non-GM label,
 certified to be completely free of genetically engineered material, and in the other
 trial consumers bid on foods with a non-GM label, indicating that a certain per-
 centage of genetically modified material, either 1 or 5%, was tolerated. These
 specific tolerance levels are of particular importance because they match the cur-
 rent European and Japanese standards and would be the United States' likely
 choices should a standard be enacted.
 The experimental design had two treatments. The treatments were randomly
 assigned to three experimental units, each consisting of thirteen to sixteen adult
 consumers drawn from households in the Des Moines, Iowa, area, and paid to
 participate. Our total sample size was forty-four consumers.
 Consider now the four elements in the experiments-the GM food, the auction
 mechanism, the experimental units, and the specific steps in the experiment. First,
 we anticipated consumers might react differently to GM content for different type
 foods. Believing that one food item was unlikely to reveal enough information,
 we selected three: a 32-ounce bottle of canola oil, a 16-ounce bag of corn tortilla
 chips, and a 5-pound bag of russet potatoes.3 Second, following earlier work, we
 used the random nth-price auction for our GM-food experiments because it is
 designed to engage both the on- and off-the-margin bidders (also see Shogren
 et al. 2001).4
 Third, all auctions were conducted in Des Moines, Iowa. Participants in the
 auctions were consumers contacted by the Iowa State University (ISU) Statis-
 tics Laboratory. The Statistics Laboratory used a sample of randomly selected
 telephone numbers to solicit participants. An employee of the ISU Statistics Lab-
 oratory called each number to make sure that it was a residence and asked to
 speak to a person in the household eighteen years of age or older. They were told
 that "Iowa State University was looking for people who were willing to partici-
 pate in a group session in Des Moines that related to how people select food and
 household products."5
 Fourth, the experiment had nine specific steps. In step 1, each consumer signed
 a consent form and was given $40 for participating and an ID number to preserve
 the participant's anonymity. The participants then read brief instructions and
 completed a prevaluation questionnaire.6 The questionnaire was purposefully
 given to consumers before the experiment to elicit demographic information and
 capture the consumer's prior perception of GM foods. The questionnaire was
 designed to collect demographic information from participants and determine
 consumers' perceptions of the safety of vaccinations for diseases, eating meat from
 animals fed growth hormones, and irradiated and GM foods. We asked several
This content downloaded from 129.186.1.55 on Fri, 18 Nov 2016 16:56:39 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 22 Review of Agricultural Economics
 risk-perception questions to ensure consumers would not focus exclusively on
 GM foods in the opening questionnaire.
 In step 2, participants were given detailed oral and written instructions about
 how the random nth-price auction works. A short quiz was given to ensure every-
 one understood how the auction worked. In step 3, the random nth-price auction
 was introduced by conducting an auction in which the consumers bid on one
 brand-name candy bar. Each consumer examined the candy bar and submitted a
 bid for the product in this warm-up auction round.7
 The second practice round of bidding was run in step 4 and consumers bid
 separately on three different items: the same brand-name candy bar, a deck of
 playing cards, and a box of pens. Participants were told that only one of the two
 rounds would be chosen at random to be binding, which prevented anyone from
 taking home more than one unit of any product. Following Melton et al., we
 used this random binding round to eliminate the threat of consumers reducing
 their bids to buy more than one unit. The consumers first examined the three
 products and then submitted their bids. In step 5, the binding round and the
 binding nth prices were revealed to the consumers. All bid prices were written
 on the blackboard, and the nth price was circled for each of the three products.
 Participants could see the items they won and the market-clearing price. The
 participants were told that the exchange of money for goods would take place in
 a nearby room after the entire experiment was completed.
 After step 5, the GM-food products were introduced for the next two rounds of
 bidding.8 The two bidding rounds were differentiated by the food label-either
 a non-GM label which certified the product to be GM-free or a non-GM label that
 indicated the tolerance of GM material. Figure 1 shows the three types of labels
 used for the vegetable oil; the other product labels were constructed similarly.9
 These labels were on the front of the package and large enough for participants
 to easily read.10 In one round (which could be round 1 or 2 depending on the
 experimental unit), participants bid on the three food products each with the
 certified non-GM food label. In the other round, participants bid on the same three
 food products with the 1% or 5% GM-tolerance level. Consumers knew that only
 one round would be chosen as the binding round to determine auction winners.
 In step 6, consumers submitted sealed bids for the vegetable oil, tortilla chips,
 and potatoes, either with the certified non-GM label or the GM-tolerant label.
 Consumers placed separate bids on each good. The monitor collected the bids
 and then told the participants that they would now look at another group of
 food items. In step 7, consumers examined the same three food products (each
 with a different label from round one) and submitted their bids." Each consumer
 bid on food products with only two types of labels, the GM-free and the GM-
 tolerant label. To correctly account for potential bias due to the order in which
 consumers saw the food products, we ensured that no consumer saw both GM-
 tolerant labels. Seeing both GM-tolerant labels (in addition to the non-GM labels)
 would have required us to conduct additional treatments. In step 8, the monitor
 selected the binding round and the binding random nth prices for the three goods
 and notified the winners.12 In step 9, each consumer completed a brief post-
 auction questionnaire, and the monitors dismissed the participants who did not
 win. The monitors and the winners then exchanged money for goods, and the
 auction ended.
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 Figure 1. The three types of labels used for the vegetable oil
 Vegetable Oil
 Net weight 32fl. oz.
 This product is made without
 genetic engineering *
 * This product is certified to BE FREE OF ANY
 GM-material.
 Vegetable Oil
 Net weight 32fl. oz.
 This product is made without
 genetic engineering *
 * Subject to a 1 percent tolerance, that is up to
 1 percent of any ingredient could be genetically
 engineered.
 Vegetable Oil
 Net weight 32fl. oz.
 This product is made without
 genetic engineering *
 * Subject to a 5 percent tolerance, that is up to
 5 percent of any ingredient could be genetically
 engineered.
 Although we followed standard experimental auction valuation procedures
 (e.g., Shogren et al. 1994), we made several refinements to our experimental de-
 sign to better reflect consumer purchases. First, our subjects submitted only one
 bid per product. We stepped back from the protocol of using multiple repeated tri-
 als and posted market-clearing prices to avoid any question of creating affiliated
 values that can affect the demand-revealing nature of a laboratory auction (see, for
 example, List and Shogren). Second, we did not endow our subjects with any food
 item and then ask them to "upgrade" to another food item; rather participants
 were paid $40, and they bid on different foods in only two trials. This avoids the
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 Table 1. Characteristics of the auction participants
 Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev.
 Gender 1 if female 0.70 0.46
 Age The participant's age 49.7 17.1
 Married 1 if the individual is married 0.59 0.50
 Education Years of schooling 14.49 2.41
 Household Number of people in participant's household 2.75 1.42
 Income The household's income level (in thousands) 50.6 36.8
 White 1 if participant is white 0.95 0.21
 Read_L 1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase 0.02 0.15
 1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase 0.02 0.15
 1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase 0.34 0.48
 1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase 0.41 0.50
 1 if always reads labels before a new food purchase 0.20 0.41
 risk that an in-kind endowment effect distorts the participant's bidding behavior
 (e.g., Lusk and Schroeder) and of any credit constraint. Third, each consumer bid
 on three unrelated food items, such that if he or she did not have positive de-
 mand for one or two products, we could still obtain information from them on
 their taste for genetic modification based on the second and (or) third products.
 Fourth, we randomly assigned treatments to the experimental units; now estima-
 tion of treatment effect is simply the difference in means across treatments (see
 Wooldridge).
 Finally, we used adult consumers over eighteen years of age from a Mid-
 west metropolitan area who were chosen using a random digit dialing method.
 Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics of the sample. While the de-
 mographics of our sample do not perfectly match the U.S. census demographic
 characteristics for this region, they are similar and provide a sufficient represen-
 tation for our initial probe into labeling and information for GM products (see
 appendix for the demographic characteristics of the area). In addition, because we
 use common food items available to shoppers in grocery stores and supermarkets,
 we wanted adults rather than students to better reflect a typical household of con-
 sumers. Although several studies have used college undergraduates in laboratory
 auctions of food items (including Lusk et al. and Hayes et al.), they are not nec-
 essarily the best choice for participants when the items being auctioned are ones
 sold in grocery stores or supermarkets. Using a national random sample of gro-
 cery store shoppers, Katsaras et al. show that the share of college-age (eighteen to
 twenty-four years) shoppers falls far below their share in the population-8.5% of
 shoppers versus 12.8% in the U.S. Census of Population. College students obtain
 a large share of their food from school cafeterias and a small share from grocery
 stores and supermarkets compared with older shoppers (Carlson, Kinsey, and
 Nadav). Although our participants are slightly skewed toward women, Katsaras
 et al. show that women make up a disproportional share of grocery shoppers-
 83% of shoppers versus 52% in the U.S. Census of Population. A sample primar-
 ily of grocery store shoppers also weakens the sometimes-stated need for having
 students participate in several rounds of bidding to stabilize bids for food items.
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 Our experimental design also minimizes Hawthorne effects in bidding (Melton
 et al.), which occur when participants change their behavior simply because they
 are in an experiment.
 Data and Results
 Two main results emerge from our experiment. First, consumers reduced their
 demand for the GM-tolerant products relative to the GM-free benchmark. Table 2
 shows the mean and median bids by food type.13 Twenty-eight participants bid in
 the 5% tolerance treatments; sixteen participants bid in the 1% treatment. Over-
 all, the average consumer bid less on the food product with the GM-tolerance
 labels relative to the GM-free products. Consumers on average bid 7 cents less
 on the GM-tolerant oil, 14 cents less on the tortilla chips, and 9 cents less on the
 potatoes.14 Consumers on average discounted the foods with the GM-tolerance
 labels by an average of 7-13%. This is a significant demand reduction for 1%
 and 5% GM-tolerant products relative to the GM-free benchmark. In comparison,
 Rousu et al. and Tegene et al. observe that consumers discounted food that had
 a GM label without a tolerance level by an average of 14%. Pooling all obser-
 vations,15 table 3 shows we can reject the null hypothesis that bidding behavior
 over GM-tolerance labels is identical to that for the GM-free benchmark for tortilla
 chips and potatoes, but not for vegetable oil.16 Considering the 1% and 5% GM
 treatments separately, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that bids differ for five
 of six products.17 This significant discount for the GM-tolerant food is consistent
 with Viscusi, Magat, and Huber's findings. In their study, consumers initially
 Table 2. Mean bids
 Food Type N Mean Bid Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum
 Mean bids-all participants
 Oil 44 0.99 0.92 0.75 0 3.50
 Oil-Tolerance 44 0.92 0.76 0.75 0 2.50
 Chips 44 1.13 0.99 0.82 0 5.00
 Chips-Tolerance 44 0.99 0.80 0.75 0 3.49
 Potatoes 44 0.95 0.71 0.89 0 3.00
 Potatoes-Tolerance 44 0.86 0.67 0.84 0 3.00
 Mean bids for participants that bid on food with a 5% tolerance level
 Oil 28 0.94 0.81 0.75 0 3.00
 Oil-Tolerance 28 0.88 0.71 0.68 0 2.50
 Chips 28 0.99 0.77 0.75 0 3.00
 Chips-Tolerance 28 0.90 0.69 0.73 0 2.00
 Potatoes 28 0.83 0.64 0.75 0 3.00
 Potatoes-Tolerance 28 0.76 0.65 0.75 0 3.00
 Mean bids for participants that bid on food with a 1% tolerance level
 Oil 16 1.06 1.12 0.75 0 3.50
 Oil-Tolerance 16 0.97 0.85 0.88 0 2.39
 Chips 16 1.38 1.28 1.13 0 5.00
 Chips-Tolerance 16 1.13 0.98 0.77 0 3.49
 Potatoes 16 1.15 0.81 1.00 0 3.00
 Potatoes-Tolerance 16 1.03 0.69 0.99 0 2.00
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 Table 3. t-test-Non-GM foods with and without GM tolerance levels
 Bid Non-GM Bid w/Tolerance Difference t-Test Statistic
 t-Test for null hypothesis of no difference in bids for non-GM and GM-tolerant
 foods--all observations (N = 44)
 Oil 0.99 0.92 0.07 1.24
 Chips 1.13 0.99 0.14 2.44**
 Potatoes 0.95 0.86 0.09 1.70*
 t-Test for null hypothesis of no difference in bids for non-GM and GM-tolerant
 foods-5% tolerance
 Oil 0.94 0.88 0.06 1.05
 Chips 0.99 0.90 0.09 1.51
 Potatoes 0.83 0.76 0.07 1.33
 t-Test for null hypothesis of no differences in bids for non-GM and GM-tolerant
 foods-1% tolerance
 Oil 1.06 0.97 0.09 0.71
 Chips 1.38 1.13 0.25 1.93*
 Potatoes 1.15 1.03 0.12 1.08
 *Significant at 10% level.
 **Significant at 5% level.
 purchased a given product when told that it injured fifteen out of 10,000 people
 who used the product, but over two-thirds of the consumers were unwilling to
 purchase the same product when the chance of injury increased to sixteen out of
 10,000. This indicates a strong reference risk effect, which could help explain why
 consumers placed such a large discount on the GM-tolerant food.
 Second, no statistically significant difference existed for consumers' discount of
 the 5% GM products and 1% GM food. Table 4 shows that at the 5% significance
 level, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that demand reduction is independent
 of the two GM-tolerance levels. This supports the view that if a GM-tolerance
 policy is implemented in the United States, consumers might not place a greater
 value on a 1% GM-tolerance level relative to a 5% level. Because of the higher
 segregation and handling cost of a 1% versus 5% level, society may be better off
 implementing a higher tolerance level. Consumers value GM-free products, but
 if GM contamination does exist, we find no evidence that consumers prefer a 1%
 GM-tolerant food relative to a 5% GM-tolerant food.
 Table 4. t-test on null hypothesis that participants' value foods with
 a 1% tolerance the same as for a 5% tolerance
 Non-GM Non-GM t-Test
 Premium-5% Premium-1% Difference Statistic
 Oil 0.06 0.09 -0.03 -0.20
 Chips 0.09 0.25 -0.16 -1.33
 Potatoes 0.07 0.12 -0.05 -0.47
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 This result is consistent with the notion of surrogate bidding, or scope effects
 (for a review, see Shogren). Such bidding occurs when consumers reveal nearly
 the same willingness to pay to avoid varying levels of contamination relative to an
 uncontaminated product. Surrogate bidding has been shown to exist in other ex-
 perimental food markets. Hayes et al. used experimental auctions to show when
 consumers bid to reduce risk by eliminating a cluster of foodborne pathogens
 they were indistinguishable from bids to reduce specific pathogens. Using a sur-
 vey, Hammitt and Graham found the same result: consumers were insensitive to
 different probability levels.
 Conclusion and Implications
 In our experimental treatments, consumers reduced their demand by an aver-
 age of 7-13% for each food product having 1% and 5% tolerance levels for GM
 material relative to GM-free food. We found no evidence, however, that consumers
 valued a food with a 1% GM tolerance greater than a food with a 5% GM toler-
 ance. Our sample was small, indicating the findings should not be generalized
 too broadly. However, the results do not contradict the policy proposal that if the
 United States decides to allow a tolerance of GM material in food products, the
 5% tolerance would be better socially than the 1% tolerance. Consumers do not
 value a product with 1% impurity significantly higher than with 5% impurity, and
 it is less expensive for food producers and distributors to comply with a higher
 tolerance level.
 Our findings suggest consumers are willing to pay a large premium to avoid
 GM contamination in an uncontaminated product. The premium did not vary,
 however, by the amount of GM contamination in each product. An interesting
 extension of this work, however, would be to examine whether consumers view
 10% (or 20%) impurity differently from 1 or 5% levels. Also, it would be interest-
 ing to see if our results generalize to other products by examining the marginal
 willingness to avoid small amounts of contamination.
 Future research remains to be done. More information is needed on the cost of
 producing non-GM crops at different tolerance levels. Also, it would be useful
 to replicate this study internationally to explore the efficiency of GM-tolerance
 policies in countries that already have explicit tolerance levels (e.g., the Euro-
 pean Union and Japan). Trading across countries would be easier if all countries
 maintained the same tolerance levels. If research could show that consumers have
 similar values for tolerance levels across countries, it could be useful for setting
 international GM-tolerance standards.
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 Endnotes
 1Wilson and Dahl estimate the cost of testing and identity preservation in wheat, including the risk
 of premium associated with accidental co-mingling and being out of contract, at $3.35 which would
 mean a roughly doubling of the price of wheat in the United States. With the size of these transaction
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 costs, the wheat industry would have an incentive to find new and lower cost methods of carrying
 out testing, identity preservation and insurance against accidents. Also, Klein and Brester estimate
 the cost for a zero-tolerance directive for beef packing companies at over $3 billion dollars annually.
 2Some argue it is impossible to claim that a product is 100% GM-free, saying that more accurate
 testing equipment would detect GM material on almost any food, even non-GM foods. In our valuation
 experiments, we auctioned foods that were tested and found to not contain GM material; thus we
 claimed in the auctions the foods were certified to have no GM content.
 3In the distilling and refining process for vegetable oils, essentially all of the proteins, which are the
 components of DNA and source of genetic modification, are removed, leaving pure lipids. Minimal
 human health concerns should arise from consumption of the oil, but people might still fear that genetic
 modification could harm the natural environment. Tortilla chips are highly processed foods that may
 be made from GM or non-GM corn, and consumers might have human health or environmental
 concerns or both. Russet potatoes are purchased fresh and are generally baked or fried. Consumers
 might reasonably see the potential concentration of genetic modification as being different in potatoes
 than in processed corn chips. Consumers might see both human health and environmental risks from
 eating russet potatoes.
 4The random nth-price works as follows. Each of k bidders submits a bid for one unit of a good; then
 each of the bids are rank-ordered from highest to lowest. The auction monitor then selects a random
 number-the n in the nth-price auction, which is drawn from a uniform distribution between 2 and k,
 and the auction monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the n - 1 highest bidders at the nth-price.
 For instance, if the monitor randomly selects n = 4, the three highest bidders each purchase one unit
 of the good priced at the fourth-highest bid. Ex ante, bidders who have low or moderate valuations
 now have a nontrivial chance to buy the good because the price is determined randomly. This auction
 attempts to increase the probability that insincere bidding will be costly. Shogren et al. (2001) observe
 in an induced valuation experiment that, although the second-price auction engaged the on-margin
 bidders better, the random nth-price auction worked better at engaging off-margin bidders relative
 to the second-price auction. Because we are interested in estimating the entire demand curve with
 greater precision not just the bidders near the market-clearing price, we selected the random nth-price
 auction with this noted caveat.
 5The sessions were held on day, and potential participants were informed that the sessions would
 last about ninety minutes. Participants were also told that at the end of the session they would
 receive $40 in cash for their time. The sessions were held at the Iowa State University Learning
 Connection, 7th and Locust Street, Des Moines. Three different times were available-9 am, 11:30
 am, and 2 pm-and willing participants were asked to choose a time that best fit their schedule. The
 Statistics Laboratory followed up by sending willing participants a letter containing more information,
 including a map and instructions on when and where the meeting would be held, directions, and
 a telephone number to contact for more information. After accounting for unusable numbers, the
 response rate was approximately 19%.
 6All experimental instructions are available from the authors on request.
 7Throughout the auctions, when the participants were bidding on items in a round, they had no
 indication of what other items they may be bidding on in future rounds. They, however, were told
 that they would not be expected to pay for more than one unit of any commodity at the end of the
 session.
 8Unlike several of our previous experiments (e.g., Huffman et al., Rousu et al., Tegene et al.), we
 gave the participants no information about genetic modification in this experiment. The reason for this
 design choice was that we did not have the resources to probe into the effect of information on bids
 for food products with different tolerance levels-so we decided that it would be better for the bids to
 reflect the consumer's own assessment of genetic modification rather than one that we introduced. The
 experiments we report herein were not used in any of our previous papers that examine genetically
 modified food products using experimental auctions.
 9We conducted these experiments with labels saying "this product is made without genetic en-
 gineering" since these experiments were conducted in the United States where we do not have a
 mandatory labeling policy. Tolerance levels are most likely to impact who can label their products as
 non-GM.
 10See Noussair, Robin, and Ruffieux (2002b) for evidence of how consumers frequently do not read
 food labels that are on the back of packages.
 11The order in which consumers see the different labeled products may cause different bids (see
 Huffman et al.). For participants in the 5% tolerance treatments, one experimental unit bid on foods
 with the non-GM labels in the first trial and the 5% tolerance labels in the second trial, while another
 experimental unit viewed the food labels in the opposite order. The participants who bid on the 1%
 tolerance labels all bid on the certified non-GM foods in the first trial and the non-GM foods with the
 1% tolerance in the second trial. We intended to have a second group bid on foods with the 1% labels
 in the first trial and the certified non-GM labels in the second trial, but we were unable to because of
 a technical difficulty. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the discount
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 for the GM-tolerant food in the 5% tolerance treatment was the same in both rounds at a 5% level of
 significance for any of the three products. The issue that prevented us from obtaining an additional
 experimental unit of people who bid on the non-GM foods with 1% tolerance did not appear to alter
 our results. (All results not shown in the tables are available from the authors upon request.)
 12In the nth-price auction, we selected three different nth prices, one for each product. We also
 told the participants that they would at most purchase one unit of each product at the end of the
 experiments. We chose three food products that seemed to be neither complements nor substitutes-
 so an increase in the probability of winning one of the product(s) should not affect consumer demand
 for the others.
 13Examining the distribution of bids, we see that some bids were greater than the average store
 price for a similar good while other bids were lower; which is a typical observation in experimental
 auctions over new products. Given the context of the experimental auction, several factors can explain
 the range of bids-novelty of GM tolerance levels, novelty of the good, novelty of the auction itself,
 differing beliefs or uncertainty about the store prices, and the perception that the store good was not
 a perfect outside option for the auctioned good. For a more detailed discussion, see Shogren, List, and
 Hayes on the distribution of bidding behavior for new and familiar goods in consecutive experimental
 auctions in which people re-bid as they gain experience with the product.
 14Table 2 also shows that consumers bidding on 5% GM-tolerance discounted the vegetable oil by
 an average of 6 cents, the tortilla chips by 9 cents, and potatoes by 7 cents. Consumers bidding on 1%
 GM tolerance on average discounted the vegetable oil by 9 cents, the tortilla chips by 25 cents, and
 the potatoes by 12 cents. A test of the null hypothesis that the bids for the non-GM foods are equal
 across treatments could not be rejected using a t-test. This is a good consistency check and does not
 reject the hypothesis that the bidding behavior was reasonable. Between 32% and 41% of consumers
 bid less for the GM-tolerance food; but the percentage varied by food product.
 15Because the participants in the three separate treatments were independent of each other, one can
 pool the data to test whether consumers discounted the GM-tolerant food.
 16We also ran Wilcoxon Signed-Rank tests and the results were similar: the bids on the vegetable
 oil were not statistically different at any conventional significance level, the bids for the tortilla chips
 were significantly different at the 5% level, and the bids for the potatoes were significantly different
 at the 15% level.
 17We also fitted several regressions to test the hypothesis that demographic characteristics, like
 consumer's gender, household income, religious affiliation when young, race, or age, could explain
 the difference in bids for the certified non-GM labeled food and the GM-tolerant food. No demographic
 characteristic has a statistically significant impact on the difference in bids.
 Appendix: Demographic Characteristics of Polk County, IA
 (including Des Moines area)
 Definition Polk
 Gender 1 if female 0.52
 Age Median age 45.7
 Married 1 if the individual is marrieda 59.5
 Education Years of schoolingb 13.52
 Income The median household's income level (in thousands) 46.1
 White 1 if participant is white 0.9
 Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.
 Note: All variables are for individuals of all ages, except for married, which is for individuals eighteen
 or older; education, which is for individuals twenty five or older; and age, which is for individuals
 twenty or older.
 aThe estimate of the number of married people who are eighteen or older was obtained by taking the
 number of people married over fifteen and assuming that the number of people who were married
 at ages fifteen, sixteen, and seventeen was zero. This gives the percentage of married people who are
 eighteen or older.
 bThe years of schooling was estimated by placing a value of 8 for those who have not completed
 ninth grade, 10.5 for those who have not completed high school, 12 for those who have completed
 high school but have had no college, 13.5 for those with some college but no degree, 14 for those
 with an associate's degree, 16 for those with a bachelor's degree, and 18 for those with a graduate or
 professional degree.
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